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AUTHOR'S NOTE

Subsequent to the preparation of this article, the Seventh Circuit was persuaded
to reconsider its 2004 decision in Toney v. L'Oreal US.A., Inc.1
After
reconsideration-which included an analysis that was completely antithetical to its
original decision-on May 6, 2005 the Seventh Circuit reversed the decision of the
district court, and remanded the case for further proceedings. 2 That the same judges
of the same circuit reversed their own decision so decisively is as bizarre as the
nature of the original opinion; however, it is certainly more in line with reality and
the law in other circuits.
Essentially, the court contradicted the premise of its original decision (which
was based upon the Baltimore Orioles case3); i.e., that an individual's persona is fixed
in a tangible medium of expression, and essentially that anything that is fixed in a
tangible medium of expression is preempted by Federal copyright law. 4 In Baltimore
Orioles, the court had earlier summarily dismissed all of the decisions from the
Second and Ninth Circuits as having been "premised upon an erroneous analysis of
preemption," and responded to both circuits' determinations by saying simply: "[w]e
disagree," indicating that "a performance is fixed in tangible form when it is
5
recorded."
In the new decision, the court suddenly finds that "Toney's identity is not fixed
in a tangible medium of expression," and that there "is no 'work of authorship' at
issue in Toney's right of publicity claim. A person's likeness-her persona-is not
authored and it is not fixed. The fact that an image of the person might be fixed in a
copyrightable photograph does not change this."6 The court went on to say that, as a
result, the rights protected by the IRPA are not equivalent to the exclusive rights
7
protected by the Copyright Act.
Finally, under the heading "C. Conflicting Precedent," the court "clarified" its
holding in Baltimore Orioles, which it acknowledged has been "widely criticized by
* Edwin F. McPherson is a partner at McPherson & Kalmansohn, LLP in Los Angeles, Cal.,
specializing in entertainment and intellectual property litigation. Asha Dhillon, whose valuable
assistance and research for this article is acknowledged and appreciated, is an associate at the firm.
McPherson & Kalmansohn, LLC has litigated numerous right-of-publicity and copyright cases
through trial and appeal.
I Toney v. L'Oreal U.S.A., Inc., 384 F.3d 486 (7th Cir. 2004), -reh'gen bane granted No.
03-2184, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 1943 (Feb. 3, 2005), rev'd, No. 03-2184, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 7897
(May 6, 2005).
2 See Toney v. L'Oreal U.S.A., Inc., No. 03-2184, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 7897 (7th Cir. May 6,

2005).
3

Balt. Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986).

4 See Toney 384 F.3d at 489-92.

Bait. Orioles, 805 F.2d at 677 n.26.
6 Toney, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 7897, at *11.
7 Id.
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our sister circuits and by several commentators."8 The court stated that the case
does not stand for the proposition that the right of publicity is preempted in all
instances; "it does not sweep that broadly." 9
The court went on to say that Baltimore Orioles itself makes clear that "'[a]
player's right of publicity in his name or likeness would not be preempted if a
company, without the consent of the player, used the player's name to advertise its
product.' Therefore, the bottom line is that Toney's claim under the Illinois right of
publicity statutes is not preempted by federal copyright law." 10 In its original
opinion, the court stated that, although "a casual reading" of that language appears
to support Toney's position that her likeness is not within the subject matter of
copyright, and that, therefore, the plaintiffs right of publicity claim is not preempted,
"Toney is mistaken."1
Right-of-publicity law in the Seventh Circuit is still anything but clear.

INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, common law and statutory state law rights of publicity peacefully
coexisted with the Copyright Act. Because the right of publicity involves different
primary rights (and generally different rights holders than those protected by
copyright laws), there were very few problems with preemption of the state right of
publicity by the Copyright Act; that is, until the Seventh Circuit changed everything
12
in Toney v. L'Oreal USA., Inc.
This article focuses on the Toney case, the Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major
League Baseball Players Association ('Baltimore Orioles')13 case that spawned
Toney, and the devastating effect the law from these cases will have on the right of
publicity, the entertainment industry as a whole, and many other areas of civil and
criminal law, if Toneyis allowed to stand.

I. THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The right of publicity is one of four separate torts identified by Prosser that
embody the broader tort of right of privacy. 14 Those torts include: (i) intrusion by
physical invasion of one's premises, or by wiretapping or bugging; (ii) placing the
plaintiff before the public in a "false light" (i.e., defamation); (iii) public disclosure of

8

See id. at *12- 14.
9 Id. at *13.
10Id. at *13-*14 (quoting Balt. Orioles, 805 F.2d at 666 n.24) (citation omitted).

11Toney v. L'Oreal U.S.A., Inc., 384 F.3d 486, 490 (7th Cir. 2004), reh'g en bane granted No.
03-2184, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 1943 (Feb. 3, 2005), revd, No. 03-2184, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 7897
(May 6, 2005).
12

d

13 Bait. Orioles, 805 F.2d 663.
14W. Prosser, Privacy,48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 386 (1960).
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private facts about the plaintiff; and (iv) misappropriation of the plaintiffs name or
15
likeness for commercial purposes.
Although Prosser described the right of privacy in his law review article and his
treatise 16 as recently as 1984, the tort is much older than that. The right of privacy
has been described alternatively as "the privilege to live a life free from unwarranted
publicity,"' 17 the "right of a person and the person's property to be free from
unwarranted public scrutiny or exposure,"18 and simply the right "to be let alone." 19
The first state to enact a statute to protect the right of privacy was New York in
1903 in response to the New York Appellate Court's decision in Roberson v.
Rochester FoldingBox Co., which held that the right of privacy did not exist. 20 The
new statute prohibited, among other things, the use of a person's "name, portrait, or
picture" for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade without that person s
consent. 21 This statute became the model for name and likeness statutes in many
22
states.
Although Prosser and others describe the right of publicity as a category of the
privacy tort, the modern approach is to consider them two separate and distinct torts.
The right of publicity was developed primarily for public figures thought to have
voluntarily given up much of their right of privacy. 23 As noted by J. Thomas
McCarthy: 'famous plaintiffs' began to appear in court to complain that their
identity was used in advertising without their permission. Their complaint sounded
out of tune with the concept of 'privacy."'24 McCarthy continues: "Their complaint
was not that they wanted no one to commercialize their identity, but rather that they
wanted the right to control when, where and how their identity was so used. Their

15 Id. Black's Law Dictionary defines "right of publicity" as the "right to control the use of one's
own name, picture, or likeness and to prevent another from using it for commercial benefit without
one's consent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1325 (7th ed. 1999).
16 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 849-69 (5th ed. 1984).

17Prosser, supra note 14, at 386.
18BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 15, at 1325.
19THOMAS COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A
emt. a (1976).

20 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 447 (N.Y. 1902).
21 1903 N.Y. Laws 132 1-2 (codified as amended in N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (2000)).
22 Such statutes exist in at least seventeen states, including New York, California, Florida,
Illinois, Kentucky, Ohio, Texas, Wisconsin, Indiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington. In addition, eighteen states recognize a
common law right of publicity, including Arizona, Alabama, California, Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin. Meanwhile, twenty-eight states have recognized the
right to publicity either under statute or common law. Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914,
935 (N.D. Ohio 2004). Only Nebraska and New York expressly rejected a common law right to
publicity, but both of those states later recognized a right to publicity with statutory enactments. 1
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY §§ 6:1-6:3 (2d ed. 2004). In fact, of
the United States territories, only Puerto Rico currently rejects the right to publicity. Guedes v.
Martinez, 131 F. Supp. 2d 272, 278 (D.P.R. 2001).
23 Although this tort was originally developed as a remedy for celebrities who had had their
identities misappropriated for commercial benefit, most states allow non-celebrities to sue for
violations of rights of publicity, though by definition, such non-celebrities' damages will be much
less.

24 1 MCCARTHY, sup-ra note 22, § 1:7.
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real complaint was to their 'pocketbook,' not to their 'psyche."' 25 As a result of the
confusion from calling both torts "privacy" torts, Judge Jerome Frank coined the term
"right of publicity" in Haelan Lab, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Ine.2 6
The right of publicity is the right to protect one's identity from
misappropriation.2 7 The damages for a violation of this right are generally measured
by the commercial value of that identity, which is often determined by the fair
market value that an advertiser would have had to pay to use that person as a
spokesperson. 28 On the other hand, damages for a violation of one's right of privacy
are generally based on mental distress resulting from the intrusion into "a secluded
29
and private life, free from the prying eyes and ears" of the public and the press.
Traditionally, the right of publicity was the right not to have one's name or
likeness used by an unauthorized third party to advertise a product. However, the
right has been expanded to includes one's voice,30 performance31 and race car
number, 32 and anything else that reasonably constitutes one's persona. 33 In other
words, in some instances one's uniform or number or car is so closely associated with
him or her that using a photograph of one of those objects to advertise a product is
tantamount to using a photograph or other likeness of the individual.
In Toney v. L'Oreal USA., Inc., 34 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the order of the Northern District of Illinois granting the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss the plaintiffs state law right of publicity claim. Toney held that
the Copyright Act precludes such claims when the violation occurs through a medium
that is protected by the Act. 35 In order to understand Toney, it is necessary to review
the 1986 Seventh Circuit decision in Baltimore Orioles, which set the stage for
Toney.36

II. BALTIMORE ORIOLES, INC. V..
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLA YERSASSOCIATION
After a long-standing debate between the Major League baseball clubs ("Clubs")
and the Major League Baseball Players Association ("Players") as to who owned the
rights to telecasts of games, the Clubs filed suit in federal district court in Chicago in

25 Id.
26

Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2nd Cir. 1953).

27See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4.49 cmt. d (1995).
28 Id.
29 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A cmt. b (1976); see also MCCARTHY, supra

note 22,

§ 5:61.
30 See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988); Waits v. Frito Lay, Inc., 978
F.2d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 1992). For a detailed discussion of the tort of voice misappropriation, see
Edwin McPherson, Voice Misappropriationin California - Bette Midler, Tom Waits, and Grandma
Burger, 11 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 43 (2003).
31 See Zachini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575-76 (1977).
'32See Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 822, 827 (9th Cir. 1974).
33 Id.; see also Zachin, 433 U.S. at 562.
34 Toney v. L'Oreal U.S.A., Inc., 384 F.3d 486, 490 (7th Cir. 2004), reh'g en bane granted No.
03-2184, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 1943 (Feb. 3, 2005), rev'd No. 03-2184, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 7897
(May 6, 2005).
35 Id.
3 Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986).
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June of 1985, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Clubs owned the rights. 37
Immediately thereafter, three players filed suit against the Clubs in the Southern
District of New York for misappropriation of their property rights in their names,
pictures, and performances. 38 The parties stipulated to transfer the New York action
39
to Chicago and to consolidate the actions.
Immediately after the transfer, the Clubs moved for summary judgment on their
claims that they owned the exclusive rights to the telecasts based upon the "works
made for hire" doctrine of copyright law40 and state master-servant law. Their
41
motion was granted by the District Court.

The Seventh Circuit held that the Players were employees and that their
performances were within the scope of their employment. 42 The court also held that,
unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by
them (which the court found they did not do), the telecasts constituted works made
for hire.

43

The Players claimed, irrespective of copyright ownership, the broadcast of the
games without their express consent violated their rights of publicity in their
performances. 44 They further argued that although the telecast did meet the
preemption requirement of being "fixed in tangible form," their performance was not
fixed in tangible form. 45
The court determined that because the Players'
performances were embodied in a copy (the videotape of the telecast), those
performances were fixed in tangible form. The court concluded, "any property rights
in the performances that are equivalent to any of the rights encompassed in a
46
copyright are preempted."
The court acknowledged that unrecorded performances are subject to state right
of publicity laws. 47 The court provided examples such as unfilmed choreography, an
extemporaneous speech and an unrecorded or unwritten dramatic sketch or musical
composition. 48 The court generously acknowledged that if the games had not been
telecasted, or if the games were not recorded, the performance would not be fixed in
49
tangible form, and therefore no preemption would occur.
The court had the audacity to suggest that the outcome in Zacehini v.
Seripps-HowardBroadcastingCo.50 would have been completely different if the case
had been decided after section 301(a) became effective. 51 That is, if the plaintiffs

37

Id.at 665.
Id.at 666.

'38

39 Id.
40

17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000).

41Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) P 25,822

(N.D. I1. 1985).
42 Balt. Orioles, 805 F.2d at 667.
43

Id.

at 670 (citing 1 M. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER

5.03[D] (1985)).
44Id at 674.
45Id.
46 Id. at

675.

47 Id
48 Id.

Id
5oZachini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
51 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000).
49

ON COPYRIGHT, §

[4:349 2005]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

performance had been captured by videotape or some other fixed medium. The court
acknowledged that plaintiffs permission is necessary for videotaping to occur;
however, once permission is given to anyone, and once the videotape or other fixed
medium records the performance, anyone can use that videotape, or any portion
thereof, with impunity, as long as he or she has the permission of the copyright
52
holder, whether or not the copyright holder is the performer.
The Players contended that their performances were not copyrightable (by the
Clubs) because the performances lacked sufficient creativity. 53 The court noted that,
as long as a "work" fits within one of the general subject matter categories of Section
102 and 103, 54 Section 301(a) 55 prevents the states from protecting a work even if it
"fails to achieve Federal copyright because it is too minimal or lacking in originality
to qualify." 56 The court concluded that Section "301(a) preempts all equivalent
state-law rights claimed in any work within the subject matter of copyright whether
57
or not the work embodies any creativity."
The court noted an exception to its preemption presumption. 58 The court
indicated that one's "right of publicity in his name or likeness would not be
preempted if a company, without the consent of the player, used the player's name to
advertise its product, placed the player's photograph on a baseball trading card, or
59
marketed a game based upon the player's career statistics."
The court then analyzed Section 106 to determine whether or not the Players'
rights of publicity were violated by any of the rights set forth in Section 106 of the
Copyright Act. 60 The court began its analysis by discussing (in a footnote) that when
Section 301 was first proposed it contained a list of causes of action that were,
61
according to the Legislature, not "equivalent" to a copyright.
That list included breaches of trust, invasion of privacy, deceptive trade
practices including passing off and false representations, misappropriation, breaches
of contract, trespass, conversion, and defamation. 62 However, in response to
objections by the Department of Justice, the provision was deleted "in a last-minute

Balit. Orioles, 805 F.2d at 675.
Id. at 676.
5 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (2000).
5 Id. § 301(a).
56 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5659, 5747.
57 Balt. Orioles, 805 F.2d at 676. The court noted that the reason for which § 301(a) preempts
52
5

state law claims based upon works that "lack sufficient creativity to be copyrightable is to prevent
the states from granting protection to works which Congress has concluded should be in the public
domain." Id. at n.23.
58 Id. at n.24.
59 Id. (citing, Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205, 1206 (8th Cir. 1969); Fleer Corp. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc., 658 F.2d 139, 148-49 (3d Cir. 1981); Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum,
Inc. 202 F.2d 866 (2nd Cir. 1953); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn.
1970)). This footnote was ultimately cited by the plaintiff in Toneyin support of her case, and in an
effort to distinguish her case from Baltimore Orioles; the argument was rejected by the Seventh
Circuit. Toney v. L'Oreal U.S.A., Inc., 384 F.3d 486, 490 (7th Cir. 2004), reh'g en bane granted No.
03-2184, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 1943 (Feb. 3, 2005), rev'd, No. 03-2184, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 7897
(May 6, 2005).
6o Bait. Orioles, 805 F.2d at 676.
61 Id. at 677 n.25.
(32Id.
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amendment on the House floor."63 The court decided to ignore the language and its
64
deletion.
The court then noted that the Players claimed a right of publicity in their
performances, and that such a right is violated by the televised broadcast of that
performance without their consent. 65 The court held the Clubs' (copyright) right to
broadcast telecasts of the games infringed the Players' right of publicity in their
performances, and the Players' right of publicity is equivalent to at least one of the
67
rights encompassed by copyright. 66 Therefore, the right is preempted.
The Players argued that their right of publicity served different interests than
the rights contained in a copyright, the purpose of the former being the protection of
individual pecuniary interests, and the purpose of the latter being to secure a benefit
to the public. 68 The court summarily rejected the argument, stating very briefly:
69
"[w]e disagree."
The court disagreed with decisions from the Second 70 and Ninth 71 Circuits, both
of which found no preemption of right of publicity claims. The Seventh Circuit in
Baltimore Orioles said that the other circuit courts' analyses were "premised upon an
erroneous analysis of preemption."72 Although the other circuits found that a public
figure's persona cannot be fixed in a tangible medium of expression, the Seventh
Circuit in Baltimore Orioles resolved the issue by holding that "a performance is
73
fixed in tangible form when it is recorded."

G3Id.

(4 Id. (citing Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) P 7305). The court noted that
[b]ecause the House's debate concerning the effect of the amendment is
ambiguous, if not contradictory, and because the Senate concurred without
discussion in the House's version of § 301, almost any interpretation of the
concept of equivalent rights can be inferred from the legislative history.
Therefore, in determining whether a particular right is equivalent to a copyright,
we place little weight on the deletion of the list of nonequivalent rights.
Id.
1 Id. at 677.
GGd.
67 Id.
13Id. at 677-78.
9 Id.
70 Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 289 (2d Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 456 U.S.
927 (1982).
71 Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
2 Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 678 n.26 (7th Cir.
1986).
73 Id. The court went on to discuss the Clubs' master-servant claim, i.e., that, under Illinois
master-servant law, the Clubs would also have the exclusive right to broadcast the game. Id. at
681-82. In its discussion of which state's law would apply to the master-servant claim, the court
analyzes, at length, conflict of law issues and the options of a district court sitting in diversity. Id.
at 681. The court ultimately determined that it could not determine which state governed the Clubs'
master-servant claim, but left it to the district court to determine on remand. Id. In doing so, the
court also made it clear to the district court that the master-servant claim was pendant to the
copyright claim, and reminded the district court that it could simply dismiss the pendant claims
once the federal claims (which it was in the process of determining) were determined. Id. at 682.
The court directed the district court to "exercise its discretion in the first instance in light of the
above principles." Id.
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However, the Seventh Circuit failed to understand that performance is just an
indicia of an individual's-particularly a public figure's-persona,and that the only
reason to construe such a performance right to be part of a right of publicity is
because it bears on the individual's persona (which is the crux of right of publicity
law), just as his or her name, likeness, voice or anything else that is closely
associated with that individual (such as a distinctive uniform, hat, or car) might.
The Baltimore Orioles court found that the Players had "attempted to obtain ex
post what they did not negotiate ex ante," i.e., that they sought a judicial
determination that they had the right to control the telecasts of major league
baseball games long after they had failed to obtain such rights when they negotiated
their collective bargaining agreement.7 4 In light of the foregoing statement, it is
apparent that the court engaged in its tortured analysis of right of publicity law and
the law of copyright preemption so that the Players would not get "something for
nothing."
75
III. TONEY v.L'OREAL U.S.A., INC.

June Toney was a print, commercial and runway model who entered into a
contract with Johnson Products Company (not a defendant) whereby she authorized
Johnson to use her likeness on the packaging of a hair-relaxer product called "Ultra
Sheen Supreme" for a five-year period.7 6 In that agreement, Toney also authorized
Johnson to use her likeness in national magazine advertisements for "Ultra Sheen"
for roughly the same period.7 7 The defendants continued to use her likeness in
connection with the packaging and promotion of the product beyond the authorized
78
time period.
Toney sued the defendants in state court, asserting two causes of action: (i) a
violation of her right to publicity in her likeness, as protected under the Illinois Right
of Publicity Act 7 9 (the "IRPA"); and (ii) a violation of the Lanham Trademark Act of
1946.80 The defendants removed the case to federal district court on the basis of
74 Id. at

679.

Toney v. L'Oreal U.S.A., Inc., 384 F.3d 486, 490 (7th Cir. 2004), reh'g en bane granted No.
03-2184, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 1943 (Feb. 3, 2005), revd, No. 03-2184, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 7897
(May 6, 2005).
76 Id.
at 487.
77Id. at 487-88.
78 Id. at 488.
7 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1075/1-/60 (2003) [hereinafter IRPA].
80 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000). The court, for some reason, mentioned several times in its
opinion, that the plaintiff never asserted a cause of action for breach of contract in its complaint.
Toney, 384 F.3d at 490, 492. However, the court did not say that such a claim, like the right of
publicity claim, would not be preempted. In fact, the court indicated, based on the same Circuit's
analysis of Cepeda v.Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969) in Baltimore Orioles, "a common
law contract action may or may not be preempted (under § 301 or otherwise), and that a
case-by-case preemption analysis is necessary."
Toney, 384 F.3d at 491.
Of course, the
aforementioned statement was made by the court in the same paragraph in which it stated, not only
that "Cepeda was decided in 1969 and § 301 of the Copyright Act did not take effect until January 1,
1978," and that "only implied preemption could have possibly been at issue in that case," but also
that "Cepeda did not consider any preemption issue at all, implied or otherwise." Id. at 490. It is
difficult to understand. If the Cepeda court did not consider any preemption issues at all, how could
5
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federal question jurisdiction, and immediately filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss.

81

The District Court found that the IRPA-based right of publicity claim met the
conditions set forth in Section 301 of the Copyright Act, and was therefore preempted
by the Act. 8 2
Toney later voluntarily dismissed her Lanham Act claim with
prejudice, and the case was dismissed.8 3 The sole issue raised on appeal was whether
the plaintiffs IRPA claim was preempted by the Copyright Act.
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by discussing the IRPA, noting that the
IRPA gives an individual the "right to control and to choose whether and how to use
an individual's identity for commercial purposes." 8 4 The IRPA also provides that "[a]
person may not use an individual's identity for commercial purposes during the
individual's lifetime without having obtained previous written consent from the
appropriate person.., or their authorized representative."8 5
The court then delved into a discussion of section 301 of the Copyright Act,
subsection (a):
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in
a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of
copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103 .

.

. are governed exclusively

by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or
equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any
State.86

The court discussed the two elements of preemption: (i) "the work in which the
right is asserted must be fixed in tangible form and come within the subject matter of
copyright as specified in § 102;"87 and (ii) "the right must be equivalent to any of the
rights specified in § 106."88
In its analysis of the preemption issue, as applied to Toney, the court noted that
the plaintiffs likeness in photographic form "is an original work and fixed in tangible
form (as no one photo of Toney is exactly like another . . .)."89 It also noted that
section 101 include photographs as pictorial works. 90 On those bases, the court

Toney could possibly have held that preemption issues in contract cases must be determined on a
case-by-case basis? Td. at 491.
SI Toney, 384 F.3d at 488.
82 Toney v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., No. 02-C3002, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21229 (N.D. Ill. 2002),
affd, 384 F.3d 486 (7th Cir. 2004).
83 Id
at 488. It is not clear the reason for which the plaintiff dismissed this claim. Right of
publicity claims in federal court are routinely brought successfully under the Lanham Act.
84 Toney, 384 F.3d at 488 (citing IRPA § 1075/10).
85 Id. at 488 (citing IRPA §1075/30).
8

6 Id. at n.1 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000)).

Toney, 384 F.3d at 488-89 (citing Bait. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n,
805 F.2d 663, 674 (7th Cir. 1986)).
87

8 Id.

89 Id. at 489.
90Id.
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determined that "the photographs of Toney's likeness are the subject matter of
copyright, and that the 'Section 102 condition' has therefore been met.'' l
Although the plaintiff argued that her IRPA claim was actually directed at the
defendants' use of her identity, as opposed to simply her "likeness fixed in
photographic form," the court found such an argument barred/waived because the
plaintiff did not use the word "identity" in her original complaint. 92 However, the
court did not indicate whether or not it would have changed its finding if the plaintiff
had actually used the word "identity" in the complaint.
The plaintiff did make an argument to the District Court that her IRPA claim
was based upon her right of publicity in her likeness, as opposed to her likeness in
photographic form. 93 Although the plaintiff apparently abandoned that argument
before the Seventh Circuit, the court did address the argument, immediately
94
rejecting it.
Staying in line with its Baltimore Orioles decision, the court determined, for the
purposes of preemption, that there is no "distinction between the content of the
publicity rights and the artistic-and thus obviously copyrightable-product
resulting from the photographic (or filmic) recording of someone's likeness (or
performance)." 95 In other words, one cannot, for the purposes of a preemption
analysis, distinguish between the unlawful use of one's likeness (which is a violation
of one's right of publicity) and the unlawful use of a fixed medium (such as a
photograph) depicting that likeness (which is a violation of the Copyright Act).
The court did note, however, that Nimmer completely disagrees with that
concept. Nimmer asserts that, merely because one's likeness happens to be embodied
in a copyrightable work, the likeness itself does not become a work of authorship
96
within the exclusive subject matter of copyright.
The court seemed to go out of its way to note that the plaintiff "did not anywhere
suggest that we should reconsider Baltimore Orioles....."97 What the plaintiff did do
was to find language in Baltimore Orioles that seemed to support its case. 98 The
court in Baltimore Orioles, in a footnote, appeared to limit preemption depending on
whether or not the likeness was used to endorse a product, noting "[a] player's right
to publicity in his name or likeness would not be preempted if a company, without
the consent of the player, used the player's name to advertise its product." 99
However, the Toney court rejected the plaintiffs request to apply this notion to the

91 Id.

92

Id.

9:3

Id.

94

Id.

95, Id. (citing Balt. Orioles, 805 F.2d at 674-76).
96 1 NIMMER, supra note 43, § 1.01[B][1][c] (2004); see Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265
F.3d 994, 1003-34 (9th Cir. 2001); see alsoBrown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 658-89 (5th Cir. 2000).
97 Toney v. L'Oreal U.S.A., Inc., 384 F.3d 486, 490 (7th Cir. 2004), reh'g en bane granted,No.
03-2184, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 1943 (Feb. 3, 2005), rev'd, No. 03-2184, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 7897
(May 6, 2005). The court, by mentioning, more than once, that the plaintiff did not request the court
to disregard or reconsider its holding in Baltimore Orioles, seems to have wanted the plaintiff to do
that very thing. Id. The court appears to feel constrained by the case; however, ultimately, the
court goes further than even Baltimore Orioles did.
98 Id.

99Bait. Orioles, 805 F.2d at 676, n.24.
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Toney case. 100 The court admitted that "a casual reading" of that language appears
to support the plaintiffs position that her likeness is not within the subject matter of
10 1
copyright, and therefore, the plaintiffs right of publicity claim is not preempted.
While the court concluded that "Toney is mistaken,"10 2 the explanation of why Toney
was "mistaken" is as confusing as the holding itself.

IV. VARYING ANALYSES OF RIGHTS UNDER § 106

A. The Toney Court
The Toney court next examined the specific rights enumerated by section 106 of
the Copyright Act 10 3 in order to ascertain whether or not the IRPA protected any of
the same rights. Section 106 provides that
the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to
authorize any of the following: (i) to reproduce the copyrighted work in
copies or phonorecords; (ii) to prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work; (iii) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the
copyrighted work to the public by same or other transfer of ownership, or by
rental, lese, or lending; (iv) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and
choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other
audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; (v) in the case
of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work
publicly; and (vi) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted
10 4
work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
The Toney court described these "five exclusive and fundamental rights" as:
"reproduction, adaptation, publication, performance, and display." 10 5 The court noted
that a state law is preempted by the Copyright Act if the state law is violated by an
act that would also amount to copyright infringement.1 06 In other words, to prevent
preemption, the "state law must regulate conduct qualitatively distinguishable from
that governed by federal copyright law-i.e. conduct other than reproduction,
10 7
adaptation, publication, performance, and display."
100

Toney, 384 F.3d at 490.

10,Id.
102Id.

17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
14 Id.
105Toney, 384 F.3d at 491.
106 Td. (citing Bait. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 677 (7th
Cir. 1986)).
107 Id.; Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 659-60 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Entrs., 723 F.2d 195, 200-01 (2d Cir. 1983), rov'd on othor
grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985); 1 NIMMER, supra note 43, § 1.01[B][1]).
103
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The Toney court acknowledged that "some courts" use a different test in
determining preemption issues 0 8 The court referred to an "elements test," which
provides that if the state law contains elements that, are in addition to those
necessary to state a claim for copyright infringement (.e.,
"extra elements"), there is
no preemption.10 9 However, the Toney court effectively rejected that test by
maintaining that not every word in a state law rises to the level of an "element," and
that the "focus" must be on the big picture of "whether the right protected under
state law addresses conduct qualitatively different from that which the Copyright Act
speaks to [sici".110

The court then analyzed whether the IRPA is qualitatively indistinguishable
from section 106.111 The court's phrasing of the issue makes the outcome a foregone
conclusion. The court described the plaintiffs claim as one for "right of publicity in
her likeness in photographic form," having determined that the plaintiff had not used
the word "identity" in her complaint, and was therefore precluded from arguing that
the photograph was an expression of her identity, rather than the expression of
112
copyright rights.
The court, without any discernable analysis, found that: "Toney's right of
publicity in her likeness in photographic form protected under the IRPA is
qualitatively indistinguishable from the rights enumerated in § 106 of the Copyright
Act. Toney's right to publicity prohibits the unauthorized reproduction, adaptation,
1 13
publication, or display of her photos."
The court held that, because the plaintiff did not hold the copyright to any of the
photographs-the employer of the photographer did-and because the exercise of
that copyright holder's rights to reproduce, adapt, publish, or display the
photographs would also infringe upon the plaintiffs "right to publicity in her likeness
114
in photographic form," such right was preempted by the Copyright Act.
The court went on to say that, irrespective of who holds the copyright in her
photographs, there is "no meaningful distinction" between the state law rights
asserted by the plaintiff and the rights protected under the Copyright Act. The
district court's dismissal of the IRPA claim was therefore affirmed by the Seventh
Circuit.115

B. The Law in Other Cireuits
The law in the Seventh Circuit is decidedly different than in other circuits. For
instance, the Ninth Circuit interprets the word "likeness" to be more than just
someone's face depicted in a photograph, drawing or sculpture; in fact, the Ninth

108Toney, 384 F.3d at 491.

Id.
110 Id.

109
111

Id.

112

Id.

113

Id. at 492.

Id. (citing Bait. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 679 (7th
Cir. 1986)).
115 Id.
114

[4:349 2005]

Life After Toney v. L'Oreal

Circuit presupposes that a "likeness," by its nature, cannot be "fixed in a tangible
medium of expression" in the first place.116
In Downing v. Abererombie & Fitch, the plaintiffs were professional surfers
depicted in a photograph that was taken in 1965, in Hawaii. 117 Abercrombie & Fitch,
a well-known clothing manufacturer, had acquired the rights to the photographs
from the original photographer, and included them in its quarterly clothing catalog
along with some articles about surfing. 118 The plaintiffs sued, claiming that the
clothing manufacturer had violated their rights of publicity by misappropriating
their likenesses. 119 The District Court held that their publicity rights under state
120
law were preempted by the Copyright Act.
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, and reversed the District Court's dismissal of the
action. 121 The court started with the same analysis as that used by the Seventh
Circuit, noting that section 301 expressly prohibits the states from legislating in the
area of copyright law, and that, in order to find preemption, two conditions must be
met. 122 First, the "content of the protected right must fall within the subject matter
of copyright as described in 17 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.123 Second, the right asserted
under state law must be equivalent to the exclusive rights contained in section 106 of
124
the Copyright Act."
Like the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit examined section 102 to determine
"the subject matter" that is protected by the Act. 125 Section 102 provides that:
Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include
126
... pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.
However, the Ninth Circuit noted that the copyright in such works extends only to
the material contributed by the author of such works, as distinguished from the
127
preexisting material employed in the work.
The Downing court, like the Toney court, noted that the photograph in question
(in this case, depicting the surfers) was itself a pictorial work of authorship protected
by the Copyright Act. 128 However, unlike the Toney court, the Downing court ruled
that the publication of the photograph itself was not the basis of the surfers' claims;

116
117

118

Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 999.
Id.

"19 Id.
120 Id.
121

Id.

122

Id. at 1003.
Id.
Id,
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2000).
Downing, 265 F.3d at 1003.
Id. at 1004.
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the basis of their claims, according to the court, was Abercrombie's use of their names
129
andlikenesses in the published photograph.
The court cited both Nimmer and McCarthy to explain the relationship between
the right of publicity and copyright. According to Nimmer:
[Tihe "work" that is the subject matter of the right of publicity is the
persona, i.e., the name and likeness of a celebrity or other individual. A
persona can hardly be said to constitute a "writing" of an "author" within
the meaning of the copyright clause of the Constitution. A fortioriit is not a
"work of authorship" under the Act. Such name or likeness does not become
a work of authorship simply because it is embodied in a copyrightable work
13 0
such as a photograph.
Similarly, McCarthy provides the following with respect to right of publicity
claims:
The "subject matter" of a Right of Publicity claim is not a particular picture
or photograph of plaintiff. Rather, what is protected by the Right of
Publicity is the very identity or persona of the plaintiff as a human being..
• . While copyright in a given photograph may be owned by the person
depicted in it, the exact image in that photograph is not the underlying
"right" asserted in a Right of Publicity case. To argue that the photograph
is identical with the person is to confuse illusion and illustration with
reality. Thus, assertion of infringement of the Right of Publicity because of
defendant's unpermitted commercial use of a picture of plaintiff is not
assertion of infringement of copyrightable "subject matter" in one
13 1
photograph of plaintiff.
The Ninth Circuit then conducted an analysis of whether or not the right of
publicity that was asserted by the surfers was equivalent to the exclusive rights in
section 106 of the Act.13 2 According to the court, notwithstanding the fact that
photographs on which one's likeness is depicted are copyrightable, the underlying
names and likenesses are not copyrightable. 133 The court held that, because the
surfers' statutory and common law right of publicity claims were based upon their
names and likenesses, those claims were not equivalent to the exclusive rights
13 5
contained in section 106 of the Act,13 4 and therefore there was no preemption.
Similarly, in Grosso v. Miramax 36 the Ninth Circuit, in a breach of implied
contract setting, citing Del Madera Props. v. Rhodes & Gardner,Inc.,1 37 held that in
order to avoid preemption the state law claim must include an "extra element" that
129 Id.
130

Id. at 1003-04 (quoting 1 NIMMER, supra note 43, § 1.01[][1] [c], at 1-23 (1999)).

11
132

Id.at 1004 (quoting 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 11.13[C], at 11-72-73 (1997)).
Id.

133

Id.
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Id. at 1005.
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Id. at 1010.
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Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2004).
Del Madera Prop. v. Rhodes & Gardner, Inc., 820 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1987).
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"transforms the action from one arising under the ambit of the federal statute to one
sounding in contract."138
The Second Circuit has also adopted the "extra element" test. 139 In Briarpatch
Limited, L.P., v. Phoenix Pictures,Inc., the Second Circuit had the occasion to decide
whether or not an unjust enrichment claim and a breach of fiduciary duty claim are
preempted by the Copyright Act. 140 Briarpatch, a limited partnership, sued a
corporation owned by two of the owners of general partner corporations of Briarpatch
for breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment based upon the individuals' sale
of the motion picture rights to a novel entitled "The Thin Red Line" to Defendant
141
Phoenix Pictures.
The Second Circuit, like the Ninth Circuit, adopted the "extra elements" test in
determining whether the state claims were qualitatively different from a copyright
claim, and therefore preempted. 142 Although the court purported to "take a
restrictive view of what extra elements transform an otherwise equivalent claim into
one that is qualitatively different from a copyright infringement claim," noting that a
state requirement of awareness or intent would not constitute such an "extra
element," it did note that a "state law claim is qualitatively different if it requires
such elements as breach of fiduciary duty ...

143
or possession or control of chattels."

The court ultimately held that the unjust enrichment claim was preempted
because that claim was not qualitatively different from a copyright infringement
claim, i.e., that the alleged extra element, enrichment, like the elements of
awareness or intent, "limits the scope of the claim but leaves its fundamental nature
unaltered." 144 However, the court held that there was no copyright preemption with
respect to the breach of fiduciary duty claims because the underlying right sought to
be redressed was the "violations of the duty owed to a partnership by those who
control it."145
Although the Briarpatchcase did not involve a state law right of publicity claim,
and there appear to be no other federal cases in New York that address the issue, it
is clear from the Second Circuit's analysis in Briarpatch that it would not find
preemption in such a case.
Similarly, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, in Molina v.
Phoenix Sound Inc.,146 specifically held that New York's right of publicity law was not
preempted because the "statute contains the additional element of use of one's image
for advertising or trade purposes without written consent .... 147

138 Grosso, 383 F.3d at 968.
13) Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Phoenix

Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2004).

140 Id. at 300.

HI Id.
142 Id. at 305 (citing Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 851 (2d Cir. 1997)).
143 Id. at 306 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 201 (2d
Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds,471 U.S. 539 (1985)).
144 Id. at 306.
145 Id.
at 307.

146 Molina v. Phoenix Sound Inc., 747 N.Y.S.2d 227 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
147 Id. at 598-89 (citing Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Shamsky v. Garan, Inc., 167 Misc. 2d 149 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995); James v. Delilah
Films, 144 Misc. 2d 374 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989)).
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C. Nimmer
Nimmer also adopts the "extra element" test:
Abstracting to the realm of principle, if under state law the act of
reproduction, performance, distribution, or display, no matter whether the
law includes all such acts or only some, will in itself infringe the
state-created right, then such right is pre-empted. But if qualitatively other
elements are required, instead of, or in addition to, the acts of reproduction,
performance, distribution, or display, in order to constitute a state-created
cause of action, then the right does not lie "within the general scope of
copyright," and there is no pre-emption. 148
In other words, if the elements of the state-created law are the exactly the same as
one or more of the elements necessary to prove copyright infringement, then that law
is preempted. However, if the state law requires one or more additional elements
that are not required to prove copyright infringement, there is no preemption.
In the context of right of publicity, the "extra element" would arguably be both
the use of the plaintiffs likeness or persona, and a requirement that such use be for
endorsement purposes. Of course, one could argue that such a test would effectively
preclude a state-created right of publicity from ever being preempted by the
Copyright Act. However, such a result makes much more sense and has a much
more rational basis than the result in Toney.
It is not difficult to understand why Congress would not want the states to
encroach on its own constitutionally-mandated area, i.e., the protection of
intellectual property. However, it is much more difficult to imagine that Congress
intended to prohibit every possible state cause of action that involved the use of that
intellectual property.

V. CRITICISM/RAMIFICATIONS OF TONEY

The Toney court had the temerity to note, in a footnote, that: "even if a work is
too minimal or lacking in originality to qualify for Federal copyright, so long as it
meets the requirements of § 301, states are nonetheless prevented from protecting
the work." 149 The practical effect of this footnote is that, in certain circumstances,
one can steal both copyright-protected material and someone's likeness, and profit
from both, with complete impunity.
The actual holding in Baltimore Orioles makes some sense (even if the rationale
does not) to the extent that the use at issue was not an endorsement of a product, but
merely a depiction of the very activity in which the plaintiffs were paid to engage,
§ 1.01[B][1] (endnotes omitted).
149Toney v. L'Oreal U.S.A., Inc., 384 F.3d 486, 490 (7th Cir. 2004), rohg on bane grantod,No.
03-2184, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 1943 (Feb. 3, 2005), revd, No. 03-2184, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 7897
(May 6, 2005) (citing Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 676
(7th Cir. 1986); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5659,
5747.).
1481 NIMMER, supra note 43,
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1e., playing baseball.

The Seventh Circuit in that case makes it clear that the
players' right of publicity claim would not have been preempted if the player's name
150
or likeness had been used to advertise a product.
In Toney, the Seventh Circuit seemed to criticize the plaintiffs counsel for not
asking the court to "reconsider" its decision in Baltimore Orioles, having mentioned
this failure on more than one occasion. However, after this apparent criticism, the
court actually expands the holding in that case to require preemption even when the
offending use is an endorsement of a product.
In short, the Toney decision makes no sense whatsoever, and remains an
anomaly in the federal circuits. The ramifications of Toney are fairly obvious.
According to Toney, what has been referred to for over 100 years as
"misappropriation of name and likeness" should now be referred to, at best, as
"misappropriation of name and simulated voices." In fact, an argument could be
made that, under Toney, there is no right of publicity left at all.
First, if one's name is depicted in or on copyrighted material, presumably the
law precluding the use of the name would also be preempted. Similarly, although the
Toney court specifically mentions sound-a-like voice misappropriation, an argument
could be made that the misappropriation of someone's voice, even by a sound-a-like,
must necessarily involve a copyrightable recording of that voice. Because the
recording of the voice is copyrightable, and the performance or display of the
recording would be both a violation of plaintiffs right of publicity and an
infringement of the copyright holder's copyright, the voice misappropriation part of
right of publicity law would also be preempted. Effectively, the Seventh Circuit
appears to have single-handedly, completely eviscerated the law of right of publicity
in one fell swoop.
Nimmer apparently agrees with the other circuits that, merely because one's
likeness happens to be embodied in a copyrightable work does not render the likeness
itself a work of authorship within the exclusive subject matter of copyright. 151 Any
contrary holding, like Toney, would leave the states in complete chaos. The
deplorable ramifications of the decision are myriad.
In the Seventh Circuit, after Toney, anyone may use any actor's photograph to
endorse their product if they make a deal with the photographer (irrespective of
whether or not the actor authorized the taking of the photograph, such as any
random paparazzi). Moreover, anyone may use a de minimus movie clip of any actor
to endorse their product with complete impunity, whether or not they make a deal
with the filmmaker.
Anyone may purchase from a still or motion picture photographer a
surreptitiously-taken nude photograph or motion picture of an actress and insert the
clip into a pornographic film. Anyone may use the same photograph to advertise a
strip club, brothel or any other service or product. Anyone may use a photograph
that includes the depiction of otherwise defamatory words with impunity, merely by
paying the photographer for the rights to the photograph.
Certainly, the Toney holding is not limited to photographs or film. Anything
that is generally copyrightable seems to be fair game, such as drawings, paintings,
150 Balt.

Orioles, 805 F.2d at 676 n.24.

151 1 NIMMER, supra note 43, § 1.01[B][1][c]; Downing v. Abererombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994,

1003-04 (9th Cir. 2001); Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 658-59 (5th Cir. 2000).
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animations, sculptures, and recordings.1 52 Moreover, the holding is certainly not
limited to right of publicity laws alone. First, as the nude photograph example
makes clear, the intrusion and public disclosure of private facts right of privacy torts
are also in serious jeopardy.
Moreover, a logical extension of Toney might actually prevent a state from
enacting a law that would prohibit or otherwise regulate pornography or even
obscenity unless such pornography or obscenity was live, and not depicted in a
copyrightable medium such as a photograph or film. 1 53 Although this example is
extreme, there is nothing in the Toney opinion that would suggest that such an
outcome could not occur.
Another logical extension of Toney would be that any state law allowing the loud
performance of music or the performance of music after a certain hour would also be
preempted. Certainly, litter laws or solicitation laws prohibiting the display of
copyrighted photographs would be preempted, as would state laws prohibiting the
theft of photographs, recordings, films, sculptures or any other copyrightable
materials. Presumably, state laws prohibiting the surreptitious recording of a
telephone conversation or other confidential communication, and the subsequent use
of that recording in court or otherwise, would be preempted as well.
In addition, state laws making a breach of an express or implied1 54 contract
unlawful may certainly be preempted when the contract at issue is one concerning a
copyrightable work such as a contract to reproduce, distribute, or display articles,
books, magazines, musical recordings, musical compositions, paintings, sculptures,
and other copyrightable "works," as well as laws making it unlawful to interfere with
such contracts.

VI. CONCLUSION

Two things have been made clear by the Seventh Circuit's decision in Toney (i)
the decision is a dangerous anomaly that is potentially devastating to the very
industry that the Copyright Act was designed to protect; and (ii) if the Toney decision
is not overturned upon rehearing, the United States Supreme Court must take action
152

17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). Section 102(a) provides:
Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they
can be perceive, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with
the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following
categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying
words; (3)dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes
and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion
pictures and other audiovisual works; and (7) sound recordings.

Id.
15:3 Even in that case, if the performers claimed ownership in the choreography, such live
broadcast might also be preempted.
154 See generally Grosso v. Miramax, 383 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2004). In the Ninth Circuit, an
action for breach of an implied contract is not preempted because such a claim involves the requisite
"extra element" of an implied promise to pay the reasonable value of the "services of conveying [an]
idea." Id. at 967-68 (citing Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 802 F.2d 1193,
1196-97 (9th Cir. 1986)).
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immediately to resolve the conflict among the circuits with respect to the possible
preemption of numerous state civil and criminal laws that are vital to the nation as a
whole.

